Neither approach puts code on your pages, which is why they are often shortlisted together. They differ completely in whose experience they describe — an automated visitor's, or your customers' — and in whether they can stop anything at all.
Visits your pages from outside on a schedule and reports on what it was served.
Your policy is enforced by the browsers of the people actually using your site, which also report what they blocked and what they ran.
A scanner is elegant precisely because it stands outside: nothing to deploy, point it at a domain and go. The constraint comes from the same place. It is served what your site gives an automated request, from one network, without a session, on the pages it can reach unaided.
An automated visit, on a schedule. Your real visitors and their sessions are somewhere else entirely, and so is most of your checkout.
Wherever your customers go, the policy goes with them. Authenticated pages and payment steps are protected and reported because the people on them are logged in.
Both avoid adding anything to your pages. Everything below follows from the vantage point rather than from a feature decision.
| Consideration | Remote scanner | Report URI |
|---|---|---|
| Data source | An automated visit to your site | Telemetry from your real user sessions |
| Can it stop anything? | No. A scan reports what it found, after it found it | Yes. An enforcing policy has the browser refuse unauthorised code outright |
| Authenticated pages | Reachable only by simulating a login | Covered, because your customers are already logged in |
| Checkout and payment steps | Require the scanner to reproduce multi-step state | Reported as customers move through them |
| Timing | Whatever was true when the scan ran | Continuous, as the site is used |
| Personalised content | One variant, one region, one device profile | Whatever your third parties served each real visitor |
| Script payloads | Fetched by the scanner | Fetched and hash-verified against the browser's own fingerprint |
| Report types | Page composition and script inventory | Fourteen, spanning scripts, connectivity, isolation and identity |
| Deployment | Point at a domain | One response header |
Card skimming targets payment flows. Those are behind authentication and several steps of state — the hardest place for an outside visitor to reach, and the easiest for real reporting to cover.
Because the fingerprint comes from a real execution, an archived copy can be proved to match it. That is a different artefact from a file downloaded during a scan, which shows only what an origin chose to serve one automated request from one location.
Learn more about Script Vault →One header. No code. Reports start arriving from your first real session.
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PCI DSS 4.0.1 asks you to know which scripts run on payment pages, to assure their integrity, and to detect unauthorised change to them. Payment pages are exactly the pages that sit behind state, and the strongest evidence is a record of what browsers really executed there, backed by the files themselves.